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JUDICIAL REVIEWS: WHAT JUDGES WRITE WHEN THEY WRITE ABOUT MEDIATION 
 
Jennifer W. Reynolds* 
 
 
 Judges are uniquely positioned to comment on the phenomenon of court-
connected mediation.  Judges design and implement court systems with mediation 
components; they refer or order litigants into mediation; and they often serve as 
mediators themselves, either as part of their judicial duties or after retiring from the 
bench.  Yet, ironically, there are few formal judicial opinions commenting on the 
procedural, ethical, and substantive issues around court-connected mediation today.  
When researching mediation, therefore, legal scholars who limit themselves to traditional 
legal sources will not have much to work with. 
This Article identifies a new source of “judicial review” of mediation: judge-
written scholarship.  At least since the beginning of the modern alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) era in 1976, judges have been writing about mediation in the courts.  
These articles run the gamut of narrative, audience, scope, and focus.  They are neither 
accountable to nor constrained by the conventions and standards of academic 
scholarship or judicial opinions.  Like wild horses, judge-written articles on mediation 
are intelligent and independent, socially aware yet also self-interested. Treating these 
articles as part of a distinct dataset—a dataset that, to my knowledge, has not previously 
been recognized before—uncovers a new, possibly treacherous quarry for research about 
front-line experiences with court-connected mediation. 
The Article makes the following two contributions to mediation scholarship.  One, 
the Article maps out a (starter) dataset of judge-written scholarship on mediation 
intended to support research efforts around mediation, court-connected and otherwise.  
Two, from this mapping exercise, the Article suggests that when it comes to mediation-as-
process, judges prioritize efficiency; but, when it comes to mediation and professional 
identities, judges prioritize other values.  For reformers, this preliminary finding helps 
clarify what court-connected mediation looks like today and suggests new discursive 
spaces and strategies for positive change.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial review of arbitration today is absolutely terrifying.
1
  Thanks to the United 
States Supreme Court, arbitration opinions are coming fast and furious, straining to 
bursting notions of consent, arm’s length processes, power disparities, public-private 
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 Or thrilling, depending on your point of view.   
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allocations of power, and federalism.
2
  Scholars struggle to keep up with the speed and 
volume of cases, rightly recognizing that the immediate developing case law around 
arbitration disrupts and reconstitutes legal norms and structures.
3
 
Judicial review of mediation, on the other hand, is a much more modest affair.  
No high-stakes doctrinal controversies, no pressing federalism concerns, no fierce high-
court debates are presently sowing confusion for mediation scholars and practitioners.
4
  
In fact, there has never been a famous U.S. Supreme Court case focusing on mediation 
practice or theory.
5
  The lower federal courts and the state systems have indeed reviewed 
mediated settlements but largely have not produced much interesting or contentious 
doctrine around mediation or mediated agreements.  On the contrary, courts generally 
defer to mediated agreements; respect the broad confidentiality privileges around 
mediation communications; and decline invitations to find mediator misconduct.
6
  
Additionally, many cases involving mediation and mediated agreements are unpublished 
and, therefore, lack precedential value.
7
  An analysis of judicial review of mediated 
agreements, therefore, provides some insight into, but little drama around, how judges 
influence and institutionalize mediation through the application of legal rules to disputes 
arising from mediation.
8
 
But there is more to tell about judges and mediation than the state of judicial 
review of mediated agreements suggests.  To paraphrase Bobbi McAdoo, there is nothing 
alternative about mediation in the courts anymore.
9
  Judges routinely oversee or design 
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 Here I am conflating judicial review of arbitration generally with judicial review of arbitral awards 
(the topic of the symposium) specifically.   
 
3
 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Asymmetric Dynamism and Acceptable Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards, 5 PENN ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 1 (2013); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012); Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory 
Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. U. L. 
REV. 187 (2012); Ronald G. Aronovsky, The Supreme Court and the Future of Arbitration: Towards a 
Preemptive Federal Arbitration Procedural Paradigm?, 42 SW. U. L. REV. 131 (2012) (describing the 
“enormous” and problematic implications of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence for federalism); Maureen 
A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Reining in Judicial Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 
NEV. L.J. 385 (2007). 
 
4
 This doesn’t mean that there are no debates, of course. 
 
5
 Arbitration practice involves more Supreme Court-worthy issues because arbitration involves waivers 
of rights and procedures.  See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 3, at 190-93 (discussing CompuCredit and the “right 
to sue” as understood by the Supreme Court). Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), 
available at Westlaw BLACKS (defining mediation as a non-binding process, even if mandatory, that does 
not involve waivers of rights such that high court review is warranted).  
 
6
 See, e.g., Julia Rabich et al., Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards and Mediation Agreements: Tips 
for Sustaining Deference, 67-APR. DISP. RESOL. J. 48 (2012) (noting that “[c]ourts generally extend 
deference to arbitration awards and mediated settlement agreements”); Michael L. Moffitt, Ten Ways To 
Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 81 (2003) (noting historical rarity of lawsuits 
against mediators). 
 
7
 See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation About 
Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 75 (2006) (“Looking only at the 861 opinions by appellate courts 
in our database, over half (52%) of the opinions were unpublished.  Much of the jurisprudence relating to 
the mediation process remains ad hoc and private.”). 
 
8
 But see James R. Coben, Creating a 21
st
 Century Oligarchy: Judicial Abdication to Class Action 
Mediators, 5 PENN ST. Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 162 (2013 ) (providing examples judges apparently 
exaggerating the impeccable credentials and integrity of class action mediators who testify as to the non-
collusive nature of the settlements they have overseen).   
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court systems that include mediation as part of the pre-trial process.  Judges often decide 
whether and how to refer parties to mediation.  And judges sometimes act as mediators, 
either while working at the court or after retiring from the bench.  These judicial 
interactions with mediation are more than just value-free procedural streamlining.  
Rather, these interactions force decisions and order priorities in ways that implicate 
efficiency and justice concerns.  As such, judges often grapple with the complexities of 
these hybrid evolving systems in writing—not in opinions, limited as those are to 
individual disputes, but in law reviews and professional journals.  
With this in mind, this Article explores another kind of “judicial review,” namely 
judicial scholarship about mediation.   Academic commentators have written about the 
phenomenon of judicial scholarship in the context of traditional legal topics, but not with 
respect to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) generally or mediation specifically.
10
  
Reading judicial scholarship about mediation gives us more direct evidence of what the 
ADR revolution has meant to those responsible for implementing the system of justice.  
In these articles, we can see judges attempting to integrate process and policy with their 
own legal training and professional norms while working in real time with real-life 
litigants whose rights and dignity are unavoidably affected by choices judges make.  
Watching judges sort through these system components and rationales is fascinating, not 
only as an example of judicial decision-making, but also as an indicator of what 
mediation has become in the courts, which in turn helps illuminate how non-lawyers 
might understand mediation practice and theory.  For those who are interested in access 
to justice, particularly with respect to improving public understanding of dispute 
resolution and decision-making processes, knowing more about what does and does not 
make sense about mediation to those who work with mediation is an important 
foundational piece for any large-scale reform or educational efforts. 
Following the Introduction in Part One, this Article proceeds in four more Parts. 
Part Two describes the general characteristics of the collected articles, such as how many 
were written by sitting or retired judges and whether the articles focused on a particular 
area of the law.  Part Three provides an overview of the interpretive framework and maps 
the four recurrent themes in the dataset: how-to; professional identities; memoirs; and 
debate club.  Mapping is an important foundational exercise in establishing a potential 
new source of data; the discussion illuminates some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of a thematic approach to the materials.  Part Four explores these themes in more detail, 
                                                        
 
9
 Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise, The Court Is in Session: What Judges Say About Court-Connected 
Mediation, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 377, 387 (2007) (“There is nothing ‘alternative’ about ADR in 
Minnesota; it is a routinely expected step for most civil litigation.”).  One of my goals for the present 
project is to create a dataset that complements both Professor McAdoo’s survey-based analysis of judges 
and court-connected mediation and Professors Coben and Thompson’s database of litigated cases about 
mediation.  See Hamline University School of Law, Mediation Case Law Project, 
http://law.hamline.edu/dri/mclp/index.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2013). 
 
10
 See, e.g., Susan Bartie & John Gava, Some Problems with Extrajudicial Writing, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 
637, 637-38 (2012) (arguing that “the practice of sitting judges discussing live legal issues in legal 
literature raises serious problems,” namely bias, prejudging, and signaling effects); Leslie B. Dubeck, 
Understanding “Judicial Lockjaw”: The Debate over Extrajudicial Activity, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 569, 573 
(2007) (suggesting that extrajudicial scholarship is “a practice that frequently provides real benefits to 
democratic deliberation”); see also Note, Advisory Opinions and the Influence of the Supreme Court over 
American Policymaking, 124 HARV. L. REV. 2064 (2011) (discussing the related phenomenon of advisory 
opinions and their possible undesirable impacts on other judicial opinions, legislation, and policy). 
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paying special attention to how judges normatively assess mediation using efficiency and 
other values.  The tentative claim from the analysis in Part Four is that judges focus 
mostly on efficiency when they are writing about the mediation process but focus mostly 
on other values when they are writing about professional identities.  And where process 
and identities overlap (as they do in, say, memoirs) judges often default to efficiency as 
the primary rationale.  In conclusion, Part Five considers additional ideas for future 
research. 
II. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COLLECTION 
At the time of writing, the collection contains seventy-three articles written or co-
written by judges from 1983 to 2013. From 1990-1999, there were 2.3 articles per year 
with a high of eight in 1996.  From 2000-2009, there were 3.4 articles per year with a 
high of six in 2006 and 2009.  Since 2010, there have been fifteen articles written by 
judges on mediation.  Graphically speaking, these articles spike in the mid-nineties and 
then increase again starting in 2004:  
 
In terms of the judges who wrote the articles in the collection, most (76.7%) were 
sitting judges at the time of writing.  Of these sitting judges, at least eleven also served as 
mediators in the court (19.6%).  There may be more, but these eleven are confirmed from 
the articles themselves.  Of the retired judges, at least twelve self-identified as practicing 
neutrals (70.6%).  Sixty-four articles were written by trial judges, nine by appellate; 
forty-four by state judges, twenty-nine by federal.  Again, these numbers are approximate 
and come from the biographical footnote and information in the article, not from separate 
research on the judges. 
 
     Number of articles written by sitting v. retired judges. 
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 An interesting feature of the collection is that most of the articles are not primarily 
about mediation in a particular area of the law but about mediation practice and court 
systems more generally.  When a judge-written mediation article does focus on an area of 
law, however, that area is almost always family law (including juvenile law, elder law, 
and collaborative practice). 
 
 
     Breakdown of articles by area of law, if area of law is a major focus. 
 
 Finally, the articles suggest a few textual observations.  As a stylistic matter, the 
articles sound like what one might expect from a judge.  Many are written in the first 
person (36 of 73, or 49.3%), which both circumscribes the author’s conclusions within 
her own experience while simultaneously bolstering the argument as one that comes from 
a distinctly authoritative (i.e., a judge) source.
11
  The tone of these writings varies along a 
range, from academic to formal, to pragmatic to jokey, with most articles falling into a 
descriptive category that might be labeled “stern conversational.”12  
 
                                                        
 
11
 My original study attempted to capture the footnoted-ness of the articles, to see whether the judge 
conformed her scholarship to the footnote-intensiveness of the legal academy.  In terms of footnotes, the 
articles appearing in bar journals and magazines have few if any footnotes, which is consistent with the 
format of those periodicals.  The law review articles have more footnotes, though it is not clear whether this 
is because the judge approaches the law review article differently or if the student editors are adding 
footnotes into the text.  
 
12
 See, e.g., Kirk H. Nakamura, Better Late than Never! The New Court Approved Mediation Program 
Relaunches, 51-FEB ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 34 (2009), providing a typical example of stern 
conversational, which is usually wry and not overly humorous:  “When Orange County Bar Association 
rolled out its mediation program via its ADR Committee in 1997 with attorneys Linda Marks and Kirk 
Nakamura as co-chairs, Sheila Fell was a Superior Court Commissioner with a family law assignment. The 
film Titanic won the Oscar for best picture. Unfortunately, the OCBA mediation program, like the ship, 
met a rather quick demise.” Id. at 37.  
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III. INTERPRETING THE DATA 
 It may be meaningless to state that this project is interpretive rather than empirical 
(since everything is interpretive), but because we are dealing with “data” and a “dataset” 
and graphs and charts, it may be helpful to explain the study’s analytical framework and 
approach.
13
  First, the project assumes that judicial writings are primary texts that, like all 
primary texts, are subject to interrogation and analysis.  Second, the study uses themes as 
a strategy for organizing the material.  There are limits to this strategy, as discussed 
below, so it is important to remember that these themes are deployed consciously and 
strategically.  They are not an intrinsic aspect of the texts themselves.  
A. Judicial Writings as Primary Texts 
First, the chief methodological assumption of this Article is that judicial writings 
are themselves primary texts and, therefore, appropriate subjects for research.  This 
assumption is particularly valuable when the judicial writings are about alternative 
dispute resolution, because when it comes to using traditional legal scholarship methods 
in ADR, very few primary sources exist.  Describing the difficulties of writing 
scholarship in an unfamiliar area, proceduralist Stephen Subrin remarked on the special 
challenges of attempting to research and write about ADR and mediation:  
 
[T]here is a paucity of normal trail markings as there are few statutes or 
rules and little case law to guide our musings.  There are no obvious 
original documents to draw upon.  The growth of mediation has been 
largely helter-skelter… The politics, as I will discuss later, are hazy, with 
a baffling array of proponents. …When one writes about mediation, 
therefore, she lacks the normal scaffolding of more traditional legal 
scholarship.
14
 
 
Beyond just improving the available resources for ADR scholars, the 
philosophical justification for treating judicial scholarship about mediation and ADR as 
primary sources is that in these articles (in stark contrast to judicial opinions) judges 
comment on their front-line experiences with mediation processes, practices, and values.  
Since court-connected mediation is a creature primarily of the legislature and secondarily 
of court systems design, detailed information about the court-connected mediation 
phenomenon generally will not come from trial or appellate opinions.  Instead, ADR 
scholars must look to other sources to understand court-connected mediation today, such 
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 Note that this study makes an effort to be reasonably transparent and disciplined about the process 
and the materials but does not position itself as separate from that process and those materials.  Instead, this 
project is an interpretive exercise that seeks to make broad claims and conclusions about a complex, 
shifting, and incomplete dataset. This interpretive aspect of the project is not a limitation but a feature of 
scholarly work.  Indeed, the meta-goals of this project would be furthered by ongoing additions to and 
alternative explanations of the data. 
 
14
 Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here To Stay and Much Better than I 
Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 199 (2003). 
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as field studies, surveys, interviews, and expert accounts.  Judicial writings are an 
important new research quarry because they provide first-hand information about 
mediation in accounts that can be parsed and analyzed through various historical, literary, 
legal, and political lenses.  
At this point, one could perhaps object that judge-written scholarship is not stable 
or coherent enough to qualify as a new data source.
15
  Judges are not a homogenous 
group and judicial scholarship varies dramatically in form and content, so it would be a 
mistake to overstate the potential insights from this study that may relate to judicial 
decision-making.  This caution is even more important to keep in mind considering the 
variety of reasons judges may have for writing these articles.  Probably not many of these 
judges wrote these articles solely because they had a burning desire to write about 
mediation.  Likely, many of these articles were written at the behest and urging of a 
symposium, law school, local bar organization, or legal magazine.  Or perhaps they were 
written to serve as a credential in a larger professional development strategy intended to 
improve prospects at the courthouse or in private practice.  Either way, why and from 
where the request came could have an impact on what judges write, or at least how 
judges frame their writings.   
Authorial intention and attitudes, however, are not my concern.  Studying why 
judges themselves write what they write sounds like an interesting project but it is not 
this project.  “[L]aw can be best understood as a set of literary practices,”16 as James 
Boyd White argues, and although the judge is “always a person”17 it does not follow that 
the judge’s intention is the most interesting or important part of the writing or that finding 
that intention, be it self-apparent or self-deceptive, is the only available interpretive 
approach to these texts.  As Ronald Dworkin put it: 
 
Lawyers and judges cannot avoid politics in the broad sense of political 
theory.  But law is not a matter of personal or partisan politics, and a 
critique of law that does not understand this difference will provide poor 
understanding and even poorer guidance. … There is a better alternative: 
propositions of law are not merely descriptive of legal history, in a 
straightforward way, nor are they simply evaluative in some way divorced 
from legal history.  They are interpretive of legal history, which combines 
elements of both description and evaluation but is different than both.
18
 
 
Admittedly, White and Dworkin were writing about the judicial opinion and other 
formal legal texts.  There is no reason, however, that their interpretive rubrics would 
foreclose interpretation of legal scholarship, which like other legal texts, “is produced by 
actual speakers in actual social contexts, addressing audiences whom they wish to 
persuade [and i]n so doing the speakers constitute, or reconstitute through their 
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 There is scholarship on the phenomenon of judges writing scholarship, though this phenomenon 
generally is more concerned with the potential improprieties and ethics problems associated with judges 
taking positions on legal issues in scholarship.  See sources cited supra note 10.   
 
16
 James Boyd White, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways of Reading, Ways of Life, 82 MICH. L. 
REV. 1669, 1669 (1984). 
 
17
 Id. at 1686. 
 
18
 RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146-66 (1985). 
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performance a social universe.”19  Reading the work of judges, whose opinions are at 
once precedent and at the same time unsettled law capable of distinctions, makes the 
reader more aware of issues of authority and interpretation in judges’ scholarly writings.   
With regard to the texts, my scholarly posture is that all of these articles have historical 
relevance and, therefore, explanatory power vis-à-vis cultural and legal developments. 
Accordingly, this project is intentionally limited to the writings themselves.  This 
means that I am not contacting judges to find out what they intended when they wrote 
their articles, or why they wrote them in the first place, or any other authorial 
commentary.  I am also not seeking secondary sources about these judge authors, though 
I do use scholarly literature to focus some of the questions that come up in the judicial 
writings.  Future iterations of this project could include interviewing judges about their 
scholarship, but for now the study focuses primarily on the texts alone.  
B. Themes as a Strategy for Organization 
There are many different possible ways to process such a rich collection.  One 
could take a historical perspective on the writings and attempt to connect the topics 
addressed and attitudes taken by the judge authors to developments in legal history, with 
special emphasis on the introduction and incorporation of alternative methods in the 
courts.
20
  This would support a much-needed intellectual history of alternative dispute 
resolution.  Or one could drill down into a set of articles that focus on a particular area of 
the law, to provide additional research data points for understanding whether and how 
different areas of practice have adopted mediation.  Another possibility, for those 
studying regional trends in the law, is using the collection to provide a starting point for 
speculating as to how easily courts in different parts of the country incorporated 
mediation.
21
  Yet another possibility, for those interested in how judicial decision-making 
interacts with mediation values and processes, might be a close reading of the work of 
judges who have written multiple scholarly articles on mediation and alternative 
practice.
22
  For now, the project identifies major themes within the collection and 
classifies the texts along thematic lines.   
Themes have their plusses and minuses.  On the plus side, a thematic approach is 
a good way to make sense of a large amount of textual material.  Themes orient the 
reader to the collected materials by providing an accessible way to think about that 
material.  In addition, since part of the project is treating judicial writing as primary texts, 
taking a thematic approach helps accustom the reader to seeing these materials not only 
as informational repositories but also as artifacts for study and research.  Furthermore, 
recognizing thematic similarities between articles can be the starting point for further 
inquiries into trends, situational or historical analyses, new pedagogies, or even different 
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 White, supra note 16, at 1693. 
 
20
 This is an analysis I intend to undertake in future stages of this project. 
 
21
 For example, to the extent that region is a proxy for caseload and congestion, it would be interesting 
to see whether judges with lighter caseloads describe the benefits and costs of court-connected mediation 
differently than would those judges with heavier caseloads.   
 
22
 Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, Judge Wayne Brazil, and Judge Leonard Edwards all stand out 
in this collection as having authored multiple works.  The collection also includes Judge Jack Weinstein, a 
prolific writer who wrote about ADR as part of a larger body of scholarly work on the law. 
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thematic classifications.  On the minus side, themes invariably involve drawing lines and 
as such can create categories that are unhelpfully overbroad or reductive.  Within this 
collection, for example, many articles could be sensibly sorted into a variety of 
overlapping themes, which means that the thematic organization is going to feel arbitrary 
or tedious in some cases. 
All that said, assuming that the organizational and research benefits of themes are 
worth preserving, please think of these themes as “themes,” in pencil not pen, separated 
by permeable membranes and amenable to redefinition.   
This study identifies four major recurrent themes in the collection: how-to; 
memoirs; professional identities; and debate club.  All of the articles in the collection 
align with at least one of these four themes, though most of them contain multiple themes 
that complicate the judges’ arguments in interesting ways.  “How-to” articles explain, in 
an informational or instructional way, strategies for managing the substantive structural 
challenges and benefits of court-connected mediation.  “Memoirs” provide more 
personalized accounts of a judge’s experience with court-connected mediation; success 
stories and conversion narratives are subthemes within this group.  “Professional 
identities,” as a theme, includes articles in which judges examine what it means to be a 
judge and a mediator, either successively (as when judges retire and become mediators) 
or simultaneously.  Finally, “debate club” contains articles that examine and/or take 
strong positions on some of the values conflicts that emerge from perceived and real 
tensions between mediation and litigation, alternative and traditional, peace/resolution 
and justice/rights.  
IV. THE THEMES 
The next Part will explore each of the themes in more detail, focusing on the 
articles in ways that illuminate and complicate the themes.  Examples that illustrate or 
work against the thematic structure will be considered.  Finally, the Part makes some 
tentative observations about possible normative claims around efficiency and other 
rationales suggested by the themes.  One tentative conclusion of this Article is that in 
judicial writing, efficiency is a primary rationale when the subject is process but is less 
important when the subject implicates more personal values and professional identities.  
A. How-To 
The most common theme running through the collection is “how-to.”  Many 
articles in the collection, regardless of dominant narrative structure and theme, contain 
practical how-to elements.  How-to articles are easy to spot from their titles: for example, 
Screening Family Mediation for Domestic Violence
23
; or Getting to “Settled”: Ten 
Suggestions for a Successful Mediation
24
; or What Mediators Need To Know About Class 
                                                        
 
23
 See Chester B. Chance, Screening Family Mediation for Domestic Violence, 70-APR FLA. B. J. 54 
(1996). 
 
24
 See Jacob P. Hart, Getting to “Settled”: Ten Suggestions for a Successful Mediation, 1 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 71 (2000). 
120 
 
Actions: A Basic Primer
25
; or Eldercare and Adult Guardianship Mediation.
26
  
Descriptive titles such as these support the how-to objective by signaling potential 
readers as to whether the information therein will be relevant and useful. 
Because of the volume of how-to articles, it may be helpful to sort the how-to 
articles into subthemes: instructions, information, and advice.  Many articles combine all 
three, and how-to strains often emerge in other types of narratives.  Sorting into 
subthemes, therefore, provides one way (not the only way) to inspect the materials more 
closely.  The following lays out these three subthemes then considers what we can take 
away from the prevalence and content of these articles. 
1. Instructional Articles: What You Should Do   
Instructional pieces explain how to operate mediation programs in a court system, 
either prospectively (in the wake of new legislation, for example)
27
 or based on previous 
experience.  In 2010, for example, Judge Howard Cummins framed an instructional piece 
on mediation programs in workers’ compensation cases in the following way: 
 
To understand the role of mediation in workers’ compensation systems, 
the “how” of mediation, and the components for a mediation program to 
be effective, this paper will look to three of the most recently revitalized 
and effective systems in the country: Oregon, Maryland, and Virginia.  It 
will provide a general overview of these systems and discuss specific 
aspects of how the systems work and the advantages they offer.  To add a 
practical aspect to the discussion, and to aid those who might be 
considering establishing a mediation system, the last section of this paper 
will provide a template for adding a mediation component to the system 
…28 
 
This no-nonsense and straightforward structure is typical of instructional pieces.  
Similarly, organized instructional pieces in the collection offer step-by-step advice on 
various topics including juvenile and family law,
29
 online dispute resolution,
30
  and 
employment disputes.
31
 
                                                        
 
25
 Myron S. Greenberg & Megan A. Blazina, What Mediators Need To Know About Class Actions: A 
Basic Primer, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 191 (2004). 
 
26
 Susan L. Fowler & Neal Rodar, Eldercare and Adult Guardianship Mediation, 36-FALL VT. B. J. 53 
(2010). 
 
27
 See, e.g., Kirk H. Nakamura, Better Late than Never! The New Court Approved Mediation Program 
Relaunches, 51-FEB. ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 34 (2009); Michael J. Wilkins & Karin S. Hobbs, Utah’s 
Appellate Mediation Office Opens January 1998: A New Option for Case Resolution at the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 10-DEC. UTAH B. J. 25 (1997); see also Josefina Muniz Rendon, Partners in Peer Mediation, 34-
APR. HOUS. LAW. 38 (1997) (seeking attorneys to participate in youth-oriented peer mediation programs). 
 
28
 Howard W. Cummins, From Conflict to Conflict Resolution: Establishing ALJ Driven Mediation 
Programs in Workers’ Compensation Cases, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 391, 392 (2010). 
 
29
 See e.g., Leonard Edwards, Moving Cases from Juvenile to Family Court: How Mediation Can Help, 
16 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 535 (2012); Don R. Ash, For the Children’s Sake: How the New 
Parenting Plan Will Work, 36-SEPT TENN. B. J. 12 (2000). 
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Instructional pieces are not just user manuals, however.  They provide a glimpse 
of what judges found important enough, at the time and for whatever reason, to write 
down.  In this way, instructional pieces viewed in hindsight can serve as signposts for the 
historical development of the alternative movement in the courts.  As an example, Judge 
Evans’ 1996 article on employment disputes32 merits further discussion not only as a 
thoughtful how-to for employers seeking to create internal processes for dispute 
resolution but also as an extraordinary example of trend-spotting.  The article provides an 
early articulation of what is now called “dispute systems design” (DSD) in employment 
contexts, though the article neither uses that term nor references two of the most currently 
well-known texts (which were roughly contemporaneous with the article) on DSD.
33
 The 
content of the article is remarkably fresh, presenting the reader with a plethora of short 
cases studies and setting forth the same basic structure for workplace DSD that law 
schools teach today.
34
   
2. Informational Articles: What You Should Know   
Instructional pieces such as the ones described above often overlap with 
informational how-to articles that set forth mediation-related legal requirements and 
questions.  Informational pieces include works on specific legal areas on the one hand 
and on mediation practice more generally on the other.  For example, an informational 
piece might explain developments in restorative justice and mediation;
35
 or mediator 
credentialing requirements;
36
 or class action basics for mediators;
37
 or mediation 
confidentiality rules.
38
  Most of these articles review existing regimes and processes, 
though some report on newer or more cutting-edge trends.   
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A typical example of an informational article comes from Judge Sarah Vance on 
mediation confidentiality: 
 
Few would gainsay that a freedom to speak frankly is the bedrock of 
mediation. The parties' expectation of confidentiality helps maintain trust 
and candor, and it enhances the mediator's credibility among the 
disputants. … Mediators and disputants should be aware, however, that, 
even when a mediation privilege is recognized, it is not absolute. In courts 
and legislatures around the country, the benefits of applying such a 
privilege compete with the general rule that the public is entitled to every 
person's evidence.  Almost every state has enacted some form of 
mediation privilege that attempts to balance these interests. However, 
these laws frequently contain exceptions that make it difficult to predict 
the scope of protection.
39
 
 
Although there is clearly overlap between instructional and informational (that is, Judge 
Cummins’ instructional article has information and Judge Vance’s informational article 
has instructions) the two forms frame their content differently and so for the purpose of 
thematic arrangement they end up in different categories.  Whether this will be a 
meaningful mapping difference to preserve over time remains to be seen. 
Another overlap between the instructional and informational articles is the 
emphasis of both types on efficiency.  In general, these articles explain mediation 
processes in terms of clearing dockets, reducing costs, and mitigating delays.  Other 
mediation values, such as self-determination or relationship management, are not as 
prevalent in these works. 
An exception that proves the rule appears in the two articles on collaborative law 
in the collection.  In these pieces, two judges explain the developments not only in terms 
of efficiency benefits but also in light of other mediation values.   
Collaborative law is a relatively new practice in the family law arena that co-
exists in some tension with mediation.
40
  Efficiency is one of the benefits promised by 
collaborative law proponents.  Collaborative lawyers believe that the practice promises 
significant efficiency benefits in terms of court dockets, considering that collaborative 
lawyers disqualify themselves by contract from taking the case to court if they (and the 
clients) cannot reach an acceptable agreement, which at least in theory might make court 
a non-starter for people who have undertaken a collaborative process.
41
  Because the field 
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is growing so quickly,
42
 Judge Chrisman predicts that mediators with “specialized 
collaborative skills” will be well suited to facilitate collaborative processes.43  As he puts 
it: “[p]ositioning oneself to serve this new market makes good business sense.”44 
Coupled with the efficiency justifications and market predictions, however, are 
ringing assertions of the positive benefits associated with the non-adversarial process of 
collaborative law, in particular the preservation of the relationship between the parties.  
Not to mention, as Judge Bryan points out, happier lawyers:  
 
The clearest evidence of [collaborative law’s] success relates to the 
satisfaction—joy even—of family lawyers who have embraced 
collaborative law as an alternative to litigation.  The study [on 
collaborative law] found that the primary motivator for lawyers embracing 
[collaborative law] was personal value realignment—in other words, 
finding a way to practice law that fit better with their beliefs and values 
than the traditional litigation  model did.
45
 
 
Whether collaborative law will effect a sea change in litigation outside the family 
context remains to be seen; for their part, however, the judges speculate that the practice 
is sound and demand for mediations in this area is growing, both as a matter of efficiency 
benefits and substantive improvements on adversarial litigation. 
The reason that these two judge-written how-to articles on collaborative law are 
the exception that proves the rule is that although the articles appear descriptive (and thus 
“how-to”) they are actually normative.  Collaborative law basically writes judges out of 
the picture, so the fact that judges are writing positively about this trend is intriguing.
46
  
What’s more, Judge Chrisman refers to “humiliating litigation war”47 to describe what 
parties are avoiding when they choose collaborative law, suggesting some deep-seated 
critiques of the civil justice system necessitating alternatives completely outside the 
courthouse.  Neither of the authors appears (at the time of writing, at least) to be a 
professional neutral, though it is difficult to tell from the biographical footnotes.  
Nevertheless, the fact that these judges are writing so positively about an outside-the-
courthouse phenomenon suggests that the articles may actually be professional identities 
articles in how-to clothing; and as we will see, professional identities articles often draw 
on values separate from efficiency concerns. 
In any event, the salient feature of the two collaborative law articles is that they, 
unlike most of the other how-to articles in the collection, use mediation values other than 
efficiency to justify the development.
48
  The other instructional and informational articles 
in the collection focus in large part on efficiency metrics and advantages.   
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3. Advice for Lawyers  
A variation on the instructional/informational themes is advice for court officers 
(judges, lawyers) who are working with mediation and mediators.  The advice pieces 
break out mostly chronologically into advice for judges
49
 (earlier pieces) and advice for 
advocates (more recent pieces).
50
  Because the advice for judges tends to implicate 
questions around professional identity, we will examine those articles in the Professional 
Identities subpart.  For now, let us consider the advice for lawyers.   
As noted, most of the articles giving advice for lawyers in mediation are fairly 
recent.  An exception is Judge Rebecca Westerfield’s article, written in the mid-nineties, 
in which she gives guidelines to lawyers who represent clients in mediation.  Although 
the content of her article is largely the same as judge-written articles giving advice on 
that same topic today, the nature and expression of that advice arguably has changed over 
time in ways that perhaps illuminate what court-connected mediation has become.   
In 1995, Judge Westerfield advised lawyers to “be aware of the differences and 
discuss [with clients] the specifics of the [ADR] process to be used.”51  Her article 
provides the basics of mediation for attorneys, including a brief discussion of definitions 
before launching into process guidance around timing, ground rules, participants, and 
emotions.
52
  Judge Westerfield maintains a steady, positive tone throughout the article, 
using phrases like “sounding board” and “facilitate communication” and “honest 
discussions” and “new energy” and “fresh outlook,” phrases familiar to proponents of 
classical mediation.
53
  With respect to the lawyer’s role in the mediation, Judge 
Westerfield counsels moderation: 
 
It is fruitless to try to persuade the mediator because the mediator has no 
authority to decide the case.  If the [mediation] brief has any persuasive 
value, it is with the other side.  A concise brief written in a direct no-
nonsense manner, focusing on key issues and sharing relevant evidence 
can influence an opponent to appreciate the strengths of the other side’s 
case and the vulnerabilities of his own.
54
   
 
On this view, the mediation context requires lawyers to transmute zealous advocacy into 
something more reflective and reserved.   
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Compare this advice with a more recent example.  In 2008, Judge Beth Deere also 
wrote an article on how lawyers should represent clients in mediation.
55
  Like Judge 
Westerfield, Judge Deere lays out timing, preparation, and process considerations for 
lawyers who are representing parties in mediation in federal court.  Her advice pretty 
much tracks Judge Westerfield’s advice.56  At one point, Judge Deere also identifies 
advocacy level as one of the key difficulties lawyers face when they represent clients in 
mediation.  How Judge Deere describes the appropriate level of zealous advocacy in the 
mediation context, however, is different than Judge Westerfield’s description:  
 
Once designated as the mediator, the Magistrate Judge is barred from 
presiding over your case and, consequently, has no power to decide it.  
That said, don’t waste time making jury arguments in mediation.  Instead, 
identify specific facts and exhibits that support your claim or defense, as 
well as those that expose your opponent’s Achilles heel.57 
 
Content-wise, these two judges are giving the same advice in different styles.  An 
Achilles heel is synonymous with vulnerability, after all.  But the rhetorical thrust of the 
two excerpts is not the same.  Judge Westerfield’s third-person advice arguably distances 
her audience (attorneys in mediation) from the adversarial mindset through aphorisms 
(“It is fruitless to…”), downplayed tactical devices (“If the brief has any persuasive value 
…”, emphasis added), and passive constructions (“written in,” “an opponent,” “other 
side’s case”).  An attorney reading this article would not necessarily know whom to 
identify with—is she “an opponent” or the “other side”?—which likely is the judge’s 
point.  The rhetorical effect of this passage is to drape mediation theory and philosophy 
over mediation practice and to create an aspirational vision of lawyers in mediation as 
thoughtful, even-handed participants in a solution-oriented process.  
Judge Deere, on the other hand, provides advice in the second person (“you”) that 
not only recognizes but apparently endorses adversarialism, so long as such 
adversarialism does not derail the process with excessive grandstanding.  Her advice to 
an attorney is clear: in mediation, you make a strong case and point out the holes in your 
opponent’s case.  There is nothing normative or romantic about the mediation setting 
itself.  Even Judge Deere’s admonition against “jury arguments” follows directly from 
the mediator’s inability to decide the case, not against an ideal of balanced participation 
or relationship management.  Again, this may be splitting semantic hairs, but it is at least 
possible that the interpretive differences between the two judges’ advice reflects the 
evolution of court-connected mediation after more than a decade of institutional learning 
and experience.  On this view, the adversarial dynamics decried by early proponents of 
mediation and understated by Judge Westerfield are, by the time Judge Deere is writing, 
just part of modern mediation.  
In addition, it is instructive to note that in the article Judge Deere does not 
recommend that lawyers focus on, say, generating creative solutions before and during 
the mediation process.  Rather, her instructions make it clear that mediation is a no-
nonsense pre-trial opportunity for the parties to come to a resolution on the legal issues 
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quickly and cleanly.
58
  As noted before, this emphasis on mediation’s efficiency benefits 
(as opposed to its other possible benefits, such as improving the relationship between the 
parties or expanding the problem statement beyond its legal contours or promoting 
creative solutions) is typical of the how-to articles.   
4. Trend:  Efficiency as Process Rationale   
What do these efficiency-centric how-to articles tell us about court-connected 
mediation today?   Certainly these articles provide best practices and process guidance on 
system design in the courts.  For judges or lawyers or others concerned with optimizing 
mediation components in the litigation process, these articles serve as useful reference.  
With this in mind, perhaps the efficiency-centric nature of the articles is to be expected, 
since how-to articles lend themselves naturally to discussions around more concrete and 
measurable system concerns such as efficiency.  
In privileging efficiency over other justice and other substantive values, these 
how-to articles are consistent with the work of ADR scholars such as Nancy Welsh who 
described a “thinning vision of self-determination” and a tendency for modern 
institutionalized mediation schemes to winnow disputes down to their legally relevant 
attributes.
59
  Put another way, because efficiency can be more easily measured than other 
mediation principles, efficiency concerns crowd out other important concerns.  In these 
articles, judges do not, by and large, appear distressed by privileging efficiency, whereas 
many ADR scholars find such privileging problematic not only as a theoretical matter but 
also with respect to ADR’s potential to disrupt and reconstitute ideological assumptions 
around dispute resolution.  As Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Amy Cohen and others have 
pointed out, if mediation and other alternative practices are co-opted into traditional 
practice and/or overemphasize efficiency benefits at the expense of other values, we risk 
further promulgation of neoliberal market-driven policies that make progressive social 
change in the legal system more difficult.
60
 
B. Memoirs 
 Often in conjunction with the how-to is the professional memoir, defined broadly 
here as an account of events from one’s worklife.  Because these articles are about 
mediation, these memoirs recount professional experiences around implementing or 
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working in mediation settings.  They are different from how-to stories not only because 
they are more personal but also because they tend to fall into one of three groups: 
personal accounts; success stories; and conversion narratives. 
1. Personal Accounts   
My original themes did not include “personal accounts” but instead lumped those 
articles into how-to/informational.  On reflection, however, it seemed like these accounts 
were different enough from informational articles that they warranted a separate category.  
Basically, the “personal account” memoir is a more personalized version of the 
informational how-to article.  In personal accounts, judges describe how their own courts 
have incorporated mediation as part of the pre-trial process.  Judges recount these 
experiences in relatively neutral, formal language.  Sometimes they include first-person 
anecdotes or observations, but not always.
61
 
Personal accounts almost always focus on the judge’s own court.  One of the most 
impressive examples in the collection is Judge Howard Dana’s article, Court-Connected 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Maine.
62
  In this piece, Judge Dana   lays out the 
history of ADR in Maine courts in the context of the larger conversation around ADR’s 
benefits and drawbacks.
63
  After providing statistics around resolution and settlement 
rates and other relevant data points, Judge Dana concludes his study with 
recommendations, notably arguing in favor of continuing mandatory mediation and 
against adding a good faith requirement to Rule 16(b).
64
  Similarly, in his Report on 
Mediation Pilot Project of the Montgomery County Family Court, the Honorable Richard 
H. Dorrough provides brief background on the mediation pilot project of the Alabama 
Supreme Court Commission on Dispute Resolution and then lays out statistics on the 
project from November 1997 through April 1998.
65
   Other than remarking that mediation 
in visitation access cases “appears to be beneficial to clients who are generally pro se,” 
Judge Dorrough reports on the pilot project without editorial comment.
66
 
A more recent example comes from the Honorable Susan K. Gauvey, whose 
article “capture[s] the statistical picture of mediation, trials, and verdicts in the United 
States District Court for the District of Maryland in the recent past: October 1, 1999 – 
September 30, 2008.”67  Judge Gauvey’s study, which contains fascinating data around 
post-failed-mediation verdict trends, is not only a personal account but a debate position, 
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as discussed below.  Although Judge Gauvey uses formal, non-evaluative language as do 
Judges Dana and Dorrough, she frames her article pointedly in the larger debate about 
whether ADR has detrimentally affected the civil justice system by diverting so many 
cases from trial.  Actually, finding a pure personal account in recent judicial scholarship 
is not easy, maybe because over the years judges have had opportunities to experiment 
with the mediation components in their courthouses and, therefore, have more 
opinionated observations to offer. 
Like informational how-to articles, personal accounts provide guidance on best 
practices through documented examples of mediation in court systems.  And like 
informational how-to articles, these accounts help institutionalize mediation by creating 
blueprints for what works and what does not.  As the three examples above indicate, 
these blueprints are driven in large part by statistics, which confirm the intuition that data 
collection is an important part of developing best practices and also suggest that personal 
accounts of court-connected mediation programs require statistical validation.  
Additionally, because personal accounts are more personal and experience-driven than 
informational articles, data collection perhaps is an important aspect not only of defining 
but also defending one’s professional experience and history.  
2. Success Stories  
In reviewing child protection mediation (CPM) in the United States, the 
Honorable Leonard Edwards recalls his own experience with CPM projects: 
 
She was the angriest woman I had ever seen in my courtroom.  She 
walked into the court aggressively, looking around at everyone angrily 
with disgust.  …  When I tried to explain the nature of the court 
proceedings, her hostility flared up as she stated, “This is all a farce.  I 
don’t want anything to do with any of you.”  I quickly concluded that this 
was a situation that I could not manage in the formal courtroom setting so 
I said to the assembled parties, “This case is referred to mediation.”68 
 
A week later, the woman returned to the court “a different person,” and thanked 
the judge for referring her to mediation.  She told him that mediation had been a “positive 
experience” that allowed her to help create a cooperative agreement with the social 
worker.  The judge was not surprised but was gratified by the woman’s change of heart.  
After telling this story, the judge concluded: “My belief that mediation was an 
indispensable part of the child protection process was reaffirmed.”  
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 The success story is a variant on the personal account because it contains more 
evaluative language around the positive effects that the judge perceives mediation had in 
the court system.  The motivations for telling success stories are not always obvious, 
though it seems safe to say that in many cases, as in the article quoted above, judges tell 
success stories not (only) to pat themselves on the back but to encourage reform. 
Yet encouraging reform through success stories, as it turns out, often means 
defending choices and explaining results in terms of statistics and other metrics.  
Although Judge Edwards’s success story above framed the account using an individual’s 
experience in the courtroom, many success stories, much like the how-to articles and 
personal accounts, are often framed in terms of efficiency gains. 
As an example, consider the following success story from Judge H. Jeffrey Coker 
of Arizona: 
 
In 1993 the Coconino County legal system was in crisis due to rapidly 
rising criminal and civil caseloads and static resources to deal with these 
demands.  Because there was no great likelihood of more resources, we 
were faced with a sink-or-swim situation.  We chose to swim. … While 
some feel that alternatives to judicial resolution should not be employed, 
we in Coconino County find them not only critical to the expeditious 
resolution of cases, but in most instances preferred by the disputants 
themselves.  There is not space here for a discussion of the pros and cons 
of ADR.  Suffice it to say that it works incredibly well for us and is, with 
few exceptions, supported by the bench and bar.
69
 
 
Judge Coker’s lean prose describes how Coconino County started its ADR 
program, how it works, what the drawbacks are, and future directions for court-connected 
mediation.  In doing so, he uses the language of costs and benefits.  “ADR is not just a 
poor substitute that fills in for inadequate resources,” he states.  “It is an efficient, cost-
effective and [ ] appropriate answer to a great need.”70  Does it work?  Judge Coker gives 
a one word answer: “Absolutely.”71 
A similar success story comes from Judge Charles Clawson.  Describing his 
experience starting in 1995, when mediation was “very new” and the legislature had only 
empowered courts to refer cases to mediation and other alternative processes in 1993, 
Judge Clawson points out that he and the other judges based the algorithm for referring 
cases on the “time required and the relief requested,” as well as the “nature of the 
hearing.”72  These early efforts increased the court’s present-day ability to “clear the 
docket of those cases which should be settled and provide time to address those cases that 
wait on an otherwise crowded docket” and thereby improve the daily operations of the 
court.
73
  Like Judge Coker, Judge Clawson distills success to a simple question and 
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answer: “Is mediation working?  Yes.”74  Here, as in the how-to articles, “working” 
appears to mean functioning in an efficient way. 
3. Conversion Narratives   
Some memoirs describe a progression or evolution toward ADR acceptance that 
focuses on the substantive justice benefits afforded by adopting an alternative perspective 
or at least a broader, more tolerant judicial mindset.  These pieces are reminiscent of 
“conversion narratives,” testimonials generally associated with the Puritans of early 
America or, even earlier, Saint Augustine.
75
  The popular understanding of a conversion 
narrative is an intensely personal, publicly shared account of an individual’s journey of 
faith.  Judges who write mediation-focused conversion narratives either describe their 
own internal shift of attitudes or recommend with feeling (“preach”) an external shift of 
attitudes within the legal system.  These shifts are not nearly as dramatic as those in 
conventional conversion narratives, but, nevertheless, subtly resonate with conversion 
energy. 
Consider, for example, Judge Marietta Shipley’s account of hearing about 
mediation, a practice she came to champion in the Tennessee family courts, for the first 
time: 
 
My first exposure to mediation came from my psychologist husband.  
From his experience he suggested that family mediation would be a useful 
tool for the courts and for the parties and their lawyers.  I had only read 
about it in journals…76 
 
Here is a familiar conversion trope: trusted person introduces the relatively 
uninitiated person to a new idea that, upon learning more, the uninitiated person not only 
sees as positive but as potentially revolutionary and therefore worth disseminating 
widely.
77
  And indeed, after taking her first training session in mediation, Judge Shipley 
was convinced.  She recalls thinking that mediation, as a product of the “marriage of the 
legal and psychological communities,” held tremendous promise for family courts.78  
References to psychology and marriage underscore the therapeutic dimension of Judge 
Shipley’s perspective.  Connecting legal process to therapy through mediation is 
reminiscent of Justice Warren Burger’s call for lawyers to become “healers,” a term 
suggesting enlightenment and inflected with spiritual significance.
79
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That same year (1996) and in the same law review, Judge R. Allan Edgar also 
wrote a piece that qualifies as a conversion narrative not because it describes an evolution 
from one state to another but because of the gentle, aspirational, somewhat spiritual glow 
over the story.  He writes that “ADR … has as much to do with the quality of dispute 
resolution as it does with its efficiency” and that alternative practices “are relatively 
inexpensive ways to have a good shot at resolving a case in an amicable, as well as 
confidential manner.”80  Judge Edgar’s choice of “amicable” is not accidental; he later 
adds that “[p]ersonally, I have a much better feeling as a judge when I have helped 
resolve a conflict as conciliator and peacemaker rather than as an all-knowing judgment 
renderer.”81  Notably Judge Edgar does not disavow traditional litigation values but 
instead frames his thoughts about mediation as an inquiry into legal structures and values 
(his opening line is “Why do we have courts?”) and claims that conciliation and other 
problem-solving techniques are “in the finest tradition of the legal profession.”82  Like 
Judge Shipley’s piece, this particular conversion narrative does not disavow the one 
approach for the other, but instead seeks an inclusive space for the best of both.  As such, 
Judge Edgar ends with a quote from Isaiah that emphasizes not blind faith, but problem-
solving, though still from within a shared understanding of sacred values: “[c]ome now, 
and let us reason together.”83 
Perhaps Judge Edgar’s piece is not so much a conversion narrative but a spin on 
the conversion narrative: the chronicle of the already converted. The already-converted 
do not describe an evolution from X to Y but instead point out that they are already 
happily at Y; thus, bolstering arguments that the move to Y is a good idea.
84
   
4. Trend: Efficiency as Professional Rationale?   
Many articles in the collection initially present themselves as memoirs, because 
they are written in the first person and often rely on anecdotes from the judge’s own 
experience.  This is not surprising, considering that memoirs are fun to read and may be 
easier to write than other, drier forms of scholarship.  Moreover, our fascination with the 
judicial mind perhaps encourages those who are tasked with getting judicial scholarship 
to ask judges to write articles about their thoughts and experiences.
85
  Memoirs are an 
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easy way to write about one’s own experience without getting too personal or venturing 
into questionable judicial conduct, like taking positions on legal issues.   
Beyond these storytelling qualities, however, the fact that some judges talk about 
mediation as part of a personal account, success story, or conversion narrative may 
indicate an expansion of judicial identity—that is, what judges (and others) think it means 
to be a judge.
 
  These narratives speak not only to judges as presiders or deciders but also 
as facilitators and managers.  Indeed, with the movement toward managerial judging, 
conventional trial-focused rubrics are no longer the only relevant markers of professional 
success for judges.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and state equivalents, for 
example, state that “facilitating settlement” is one of the judge’s responsibilities in 
managing the litigation process.
86
  In memoirs about mediation, therefore, judges can 
explore how they themselves have fulfilled the dictates of the rules and other newer 
professional requirements around court-connected alternative practices.  
Because so many of the memoirs appealed to statistics and other efficiency 
metrics, it would be useful to analyze the normative justifications about mediation 
included in this section.  One suggestive trend in the memoirs as collected here is the 
apparent progression from conversion narratives (mid-1990s) to statistics-heavy personal 
accounts (more recent).  This progression, if it exists, may provide further evidence that, 
as discussed in the how-to section, the efficiency priorities of mediation today far 
outweigh other mediation-related values.  It may also suggest that, at one time, judges felt 
more comfortable with other substantive rationales for mediation, outside of efficiency.  
It may also suggest that in these memoirs judges are identifying themselves with their 
courthouses and, accordingly, assume the same efficiency-centric norms and values 
around mediation process that we saw in the informational articles above. 
Of course, this progression may not be a progression at all, but instead may 
simply reflect the insufficiency of the data or the inadequacy of the interpretation.  As 
such, and in keeping with the personal nature of memoirs, it may be helpful in the next 
phase of the project to follow up with the individual judges who wrote these memoirs.  
Interviews could shed light on why and how the judges wrote their articles, whether they 
believe there has been an intellectual progression from more substantive/emotional 
rationales for mediation to more efficiency-oriented arguments, and what kind of follow-
up commentary, if any, they would add to their articles today.
87
   
C. Professional Identities88  
My transition from sitting judge to sitting, standing, walking mediator is 
still a work in progress.  ADR looks a lot different from within the 
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profession than it did from my former perch.  Mediation is not an adjunct 
to judging, no more than teaching is an adjunct to being a lawyer.  These 
are equal but separate professions, each with their own unique set of 
skills.
89
 
 
At least twenty-three of the articles in the collection are written by retired judges 
who now serve as neutrals (12) and sitting judges who also mediate (11).
90
  The 
phenomenon of the judge-mediator has taken on special significance as settlement 
conferences have become more and more common.  Whether judges should serve as 
mediators and in what capacities are often subjects of judicial writings, as well as what 
the difference between a judge-mediator and a lay mediator are.  These writings, in sharp 
contrast to the how-to narratives and the memoirs, often address the intrinsic values and 
priorities of the justice system, separate from efficiency concerns. 
1. Retired Judges Who Mediate  
Many of the articles in the collection are written by retired judges who now 
mediate professionally, but few of these refer explicitly to that professional transition.  
Judge Michael Orfield is an exception.  Judge Orfield, the author of the excerpt above, 
wrote a short piece in a California bar journal describing his move from the “third 
branch” to the “business arrangement” of private mediation.91  The transition is dramatic 
but evidently not unpleasant.  In fact, Judge Orfield appears to relish the engaged 
participation that his new role affords.  For example, the formalities that previously 
attended his judicial office (e.g., attorneys prefacing disagreement with “with all due 
respect”) have been replaced by more direct feedback (e.g., attorneys prefacing 
disagreement with “that dog will not hunt” or “you’ve got to be kidding”).92 Judge 
Orfield sees judging and mediating as “separate and distinct” and that techniques he used 
as a judge, such as proposing settlements, are not appropriate now that he is a mediator—
precisely because he used to be a judge.  Here, Judge Orfield recognizes and advises 
against an attenuated version of what Ed Brunet calls “muscle mediation,” a type of 
forceful evaluative mediation Brunet associates with judges who mediate cases.
93
   
Again, Judge Orfield’s essay is noteworthy because most of the other articles in 
the collection written by retired judges turned mediators do not talk about the 
professional transition from judge to mediator but instead focus on substantive and 
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procedural topics relevant to mediation.
94
  One might speculate (and indeed, several 
people have suggested to me) that one reason retired judges turned mediators write these 
articles may simply be to market and promote themselves for lucrative second careers as 
neutrals.
95
  Judges who position themselves as experts (how-to) or successful 
designers/managers (memoirs) could be padding their resumes to make themselves more 
attractive for high-end mediation gigs in the near future.  
Yet, padding and marketing, if those are indeed the motives, are not reasons to 
discount this scholarship.
96
  In fact, the opposite is true.  If judges do pad resumes and 
market themselves through scholarship, analyzing that literature as a whole could 
generate fascinating insights into what aspects of mediation knowledge and experience 
are perceived as more or less marketable than others.  This kind of “market research” 
could greatly enhance efforts to reform and/or promulgate mediation practices. 
2. Sitting Judges Who Mediate 
Judges make public decisions that are binding on litigants.  Mediators facilitate 
private discussions between parties, sometimes weighing in with evaluative opinions, but 
in no event can bind the participants to an outcome they refuse to sign onto.  These are 
strikingly different professional roles that, in the age of alternative practice and 
mediation, together now constitute what it means, for many judges, to be a judge. 
Judge Judith Dein, a magistrate in the District of Massachusetts, recently wrote 
that “wearing two hats” as a judge and a mediator bifurcates her job in complex and 
rewarding ways:
97
 
 
There is a real distinction between my role in cases in which I am serving 
as the mediator, and cases in which I am serving as the presiding judge.  
As a mediator, I view my role as helping the parties reach a resolution that 
meets their needs as best as possible.  It is my responsibility to help the 
parties identity the real (sometimes as opposed to the “legal”) issues in 
dispute …98 
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Judge Dein observes that each role helps her become more effective in the other.  Acting 
as a mediator, she can bring useful evaluative perspectives and advice to the parties.
99
  
Acting as a judge, she has a heightened awareness of the “people behind the disputes” 
and a renewed commitment to justice for the litigants.
100
   
Judge Dein’s modern perspective on the dual role of judge-as-mediator is the 
latest in a trajectory of articles by judges exploring how to integrate mediation roles and 
responsibilities into traditional judicial identities.
101
  Understandably, for many judges, 
expanding their professional roles to include not only new practices but also new theories 
of dispute resolution required some internal ordering of priorities and approaches in order 
to make the transition.  Two relatively early reflections on the judge’s role-as-mediator in 
court-connected mediation demonstrate the commitment of judges to retaining judicial 
personality and norms: 
 
Active trial judges make fine mediators.  The lawyer and the judge that 
may already be involved in the case know the judge/mediator and how he 
or she thinks.  The judge/mediator generally is well versed in liability and 
quantum issues.  The judge/mediator possesses a wealth of experience and 
skills useful to successful mediation.  Judge/mediators are successful, in 
part, because their opinions carry weight.  If the judge proposes a 
particular compromise, the parties take notice, even if the suggestion is 
known to be non-binding.
102
 (Judge Bleich, 1995) 
 
Mediators tend to fall into one of two camps.  They are often referred to as 
“facilitative” and “evaluative.”  That’s mediator-speak for neutrals who 
don’t express their views on the merits, likely outcomes or worth of a 
case, and neutrals who do.  I am emphatically one of the latter.  I firmly 
believe that the parties, to say nothing of the lawyers, expect guidance in 
the process from the mediator, even to the point – where appropriate – of 
suggesting a settlement figure.  It may look good in a textbook to describe 
how settlements magically emerge from “feel good” seances overseen by a 
third party, but this third party has yet to see one of those miracles 
occur.
103
 (Judge Hart, 2000) 
 
As Brunet points out, judges who mediate generally follow standard mediation 
procedures but “[n]onetheless judicial mediation is unlike other forms of mediation in 
one very important respect: the mediator is a judge.”104  Parties are arguably more likely 
to hear the judge-mediator’s evaluative assessments more loudly and authoritatively than 
the evaluative assessments of the non-judge mediator, which could overweight the 
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mediator’s role and thus lead to self-determination and consent problems.105  Yet, as the 
writings of Judges Dein, Bleich, and Hart suggest, it is precisely these evaluative 
assessments that make mediation valuable for the parties, and not just as an efficiency 
matter.  Part of the assessment, after all, is involving the parties in explaining and 
understanding the issues, something at which many judges excel.  As Judge Hart states: 
“Once you have the clients in the room, don’t make them potted plants. … [L]et the 
plaintiff have the floor. … [I]t can be a wake-up call for the defense to see just how 
invested the plaintiff is in the case.”106  Perhaps the flip side of the judge-mediator 
overpowering the parties’ capability for self-determination is the judge-mediator 
empowering weaker parties to participate, by virtue of the apparently “official” 
recognition and acknowledgement that the parties experience in the actual judicial 
presence. 
Another worry scholars have about judges who mediate is that the role confusion 
of judge/mediator is potentially quite problematic in cases involving judges who first 
mediate and then preside over the same case.
107
  How can the judge put aside what she 
has learned in the mediation (or in the settlement conference, for that matter) and 
impartially oversee the litigation?  And how can the parties ignore what they may 
perceive as signaling from the judge during the mediation?   
The articles in the collection suggest that judges are aware of this potential 
problem and address it in various ways.  For many judges, court practices preclude them 
from mixing roles.  Judge Dein, for example, remarks that magistrates in the District of 
Massachusetts only preside over cases they mediate in “extraordinary cases.”108  
Likewise, Judge Celeste Bremer states that in the Southern District of Iowa, “[w]hen one 
of us is assigned as the trial judge on consent of the parties, another magistrate will serve 
as the settlement judge,” a role similar to a mediator.109  According to Judge Bremer, 
having the same trial judge as mediator discourages parties from “participat[ing] fully or 
candidly in the mediation process,” which in turn prevents them from “learn[ing] through 
mediation what their best settlement option really is,” which precludes mediation’s 
efficiency benefits and substantive values, such as self-determination.
110
   
These comments from Judge Bremer come from an interview conducted by 
retired judge-turned-professor Wayne Brazil.  In that same interview, Brazil talks with 
Judge Karen Klein of the District of North Dakota, making this particular work the “triple 
threat,” the most judicially authored of all the articles.  Judge Klein, who herself has 
written one of the more scholarly articles in the collection (discussed in the Debate Club), 
has a different view on the propriety and value of judges serving both as mediator and 
trial judge on the same case: 
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Mediation is a process that empowers the parties to reach their own 
decisions, and that should include the power to choose the trial judge as 
their mediator, as long as they are well-informed about their options and 
really can choose among those options freely. … I have never sensed 
during mediation of a case assigned to me for trial that the lawyers or 
parties felt any obligation to settle, or any duty to please me or to relieve 
my docket.
111
 
 
Parties may want the same judge for both processes because of informational 
streamlining
112
 or because they believe that the mediation has “added value” as a kind of 
“day in court” if the trial judge participates.113  Of course, these benefits are only 
available with parties who have informedly and unreservedly consented.  Part of Judge 
Klein’s strategy for making sure that the parties freely choose their process is telling 
settlement participants that “the court has no stake in the outcome and is pleased to have 
a trial if they don’t reach a settlement.”114  Wayne Brazil gracefully wraps up the 
interview by finding common ground. 
3. The Judge-Mediator-Professor   
The mention of Wayne Brazil suggests an additional professional identities 
category and possible area for further research: the judge-mediator-professor.  Brazil has 
had an extraordinary career as an innovator and leader on some of the most ambitious 
court-connected ADR reform efforts in the country.
115
  As a magistrate judge, Brazil 
authored several well-received articles on mediation topics as diverse as early neutral 
evaluation, confidentiality, and the “spiritual fatigue” mediators often experience.116  
More recently, and since joining the faculty at Berkeley Law, Brazil wrote an article 
exploring the rights-resolution tension in modern dispute resolution.  This tension is at 
the heart of the professional identities articles in the collection: 
 
[I]f our ADR processes are occupying, or about to occupy, most of the 
field of civil justice, is it wise for us to try to promote resolution by 
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sending messages to parties that challenge their belief in the reality of 
rights, that undermine their confidence in the rule of law?  When we 
emphasize such messages (e.g., to encourage “flexibility” in the parties’ 
settlement positions), we may be, in effect, promoting resolution in 
individual cases at the cost of intensifying parties’ alienation from the 
system of civil justice.  In so doing, we risk elevating resolution over 
rights.
117
  
 
Note the first-person plural (we, us, our) here.  First-person plural is characteristic 
of Brazil’s work.  He often frames social and legal challenges as “our” responsibility that 
“we” must develop possible solutions to address.  This could be simply a stylistic choice 
or it could indicate that Brazil conceives of his audience broadly, including judges, 
mediators, professors, and everyone else with a stake in dispute resolution (so, basically 
everyone).   As an interpretive matter, however, the choice of first-person plural in this 
article complicates Brazil’s text in interesting ways.  For example, consider the following 
sentence: 
 
If we want to protect that balance [between resolution and rights], we had 
better be prepared to counter accusations, sometimes by judges, that 
mediators care more about protecting themselves and their precious 
(literally) process than they do about whether parties comply with 
substantive societal norms.
118
   
 
Who is the “we” here?  Brazil could have written something like “ourselves as 
judges” instead of “judges,” or “we mediators” instead of “mediators,” but instead he 
moves those people into the third person, arguably repositioning the tension between 
rights and resolution as a professional and structural tension between those two roles, 
syntactically separate from himself and the reader, the “we” who want to protect the 
balance.
119
  But if “we” does not include them then who are “we”?  Following this train 
of thought, earlier in the piece Brazil mentions “our field,”120 which initially sounded like 
“we mediators” but in light of the third-person shift above now seems amenable to 
different interpretations.  Could “we” refer to law professors, for example, and could “our 
field” refer to legal academia?  If so, how does this rhetorical shift from addressing 
mediators and judges to addressing law professors implicate professors in front-line 
efforts to ensure that the practice of mediation supports rights and justice?  With this in 
mind, consider this possible reworking of two sentences from Brazil’s article: 
 
To maximize our movement’s capacity to move the real world, we must 
reassure the skeptics, the thoughtful as well as the cynical, that it is the 
real world in which our methods and theses are rooted.  We must be 
                                                        
 
117
 Wayne D. Brazil, Rights and Resolution in Mediation: Our Responsibility To Debate the Reach of 
Our Responsibility, 16 No. 4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 9, 12 (2010). 
 
118
 Id. 
 
119
 I don’t think he is trying to avoid criticism as a mediator, however. 
 
120
 Brazil, supra note 117, at 9. 
139 
 
understood as appreciating fully the importance of having visible and real 
sources of discipline in our human affairs. 
 
To maximize the legal academy’s capacity to move the real world, law 
professors must reassure the skeptics, the thoughtful as well as the cynical, 
that it is the real world in which the academy’s methods and theses are 
rooted.  The legal academy must be understood as appreciating fully the 
importance of having visible and real sources of discipline in academic (or 
maybe intellectual) affairs.
121
 
 
Reimagining Brazil’s article in this way connects his thinking about rights and 
resolution to larger “ivory tower” debates that seek to define and redefine the academy’s 
relationship and responsibility to society at large.  These debates are especially salient for 
law schools and for ADR faculty in law schools, because we prepare students to engage 
directly with systems of power and change: namely, law and politics.  Reading Brazil’s 
article as not just an address to mediators or judge-mediators but also – in keeping with 
his tripartite professional identity as judge, mediator, and professor – as a direct challenge 
to ADR professors opens new mental space for rethinking how we teach ADR not as 
alternative to but in the context of rights and law.  
Adding “professor” into the professional identities of judge-mediators who write 
scholarship, therefore, suggests possible new interpretive layers and connections between 
practice and theory.  The foregoing analysis is just one example of how rereading the 
works of someone with multiple professional hats can complicate and deepen 
understanding of the material.  It may be, with additional examples of and research into 
judge-mediator-professor writings, that along with these practice-theory insights, 
conceptual tensions and value rifts will emerge.  The judge-professor, for example, is an 
intriguing and somewhat paradoxical creature, as is the judge-mediator (though in 
different ways).  As Stephen Burbank points out in an article on Judge Jack Weinstein 
(who also appears in this collection, see below), the law professor enjoys an intellectual 
freedom and independence that are not always consonant with the responsibilities and 
professional parameters of judging: 
 
Academic freedom and judicial independence are alike in some respects, 
including the fact that they exist to protect institutions.  They also differ in 
critical respects.  Whereas intellectual autonomy is central to the integrity 
of the academic enterprise, it can be inimical to the perceived legitimacy 
of the judiciary in a democracy.
122
 
 
Burbank argues that “an important part of Weinstein the judge is Weinstein the 
law professor”123 and as such traces Weinstein’s academic tendencies and intellectual 
independence not only through Weinstein’s published opinions but also, importantly, 
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through his judicial activities separate from those opinions.
124
  He admires Weinstein but 
also believes that the independence of professor is not compatible in all ways with the 
responsibilities of the judiciary, and that Weinstein was a flawed judge in this respect.
125
 
 In terms of trajectory, Brazil is not precisely in the same situation as Judge 
Weinstein.  However, tracking Brazil’s scholarship may reveal important discontinuities 
between real-world problems and ADR research and pedagogy, which can in turn suggest 
new potential synergies for practitioners and professors.  
4. Trend: Efficiency is Not Enough   
Whatever the merits of the judge-mediator role debates, one interesting thing 
about these divergent views is that here we see the reemergence of mediation values other 
than efficiency.  Self-determination, consent, and substantive justice are again at the 
forefront, not just measurements of efficiency.  In fact, efficiency would likely militate 
against having different trial judges from mediators/settlement conference judges, 
because the timing would likely be smoother if the settlement conference or mediation 
could run right into the litigation instead of needing to be reallocated to someone else.  
Perhaps these non-efficiency arguments come up here because judges in these positions 
have their skin in the game, such as it is, and are holding themselves accountable for the 
process in a more personal, value-bound way.  Here values of mediation and values 
around judging converge: issues of fairness, impartiality, procedural stability, rule of law 
not of man, and so on.   
For judge-mediator-professors (as for judge-professors), this normative layer is 
even more apparent, perhaps, because of the decidedly non-efficient norms of legal 
academia.  Tenured professors want their work to have an impact, of course, but that 
impact is generally not measured in terms of market penetration or other external metrics 
(and even if it were measured in this way and the professor came up lacking, the 
professor’s job would be safe).  As such, academic work can afford to examine priorities 
other than efficiency.   
Finally, as mentioned above, further research into Brazil’s works, especially 
research that contextualizes his writing in the larger historical development of alternative 
movements and court-connected practices would be valuable.  Additionally, like the 
memoirs, our understanding of the works in this subtheme could benefit from follow-up 
interviews with judges.  Again, this is not because the judges will explain what the texts 
mean, but because they can complicate and augment the issues explicit and implicit in 
their works. 
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D. Debate Club 
 In a 1983 dedication address of the Notre Dame London Law Centre, Justice 
Warren Burger commented: 
 
If Sir Thomas More’s utopia were achieved, we would not need lawyers; 
and without lawyers perhaps we could survive without judges, or at least 
with fewer judges.  In that ideal setting we would need even fewer 
physicians, I suspect, for the stresses that produce illness would be far 
less.  In that happy state of Thomas More, the population would be made 
up of producers, consumers and teachers—teachers in the broadest sense 
of that term.  There would be no lawyers, no judges, and no soldiers.  But 
until that society of the Golden Rule and the Golden Day is achieved, 
lawyers and judges will be necessary wherever men and women are 
gathered in villages, towns, and cities, and rub shoulders, share 
boundaries, and deal with each other daily.
126
 
 
Here Justice Burger draws upon a metaphor that I have commented on in earlier 
work: associating law and lawyers with the non-utopian state.
127
  In that work, I argue 
that much of the appeal of alternative processes lies not just in its positive assertion of an 
idealized vision of harmonious dispute resolution (utopia) but also in its express rejection 
of broken, dehumanizing adversarial processes (dystopia).
128
  Later in the same address, 
Justice Burger presses again on the disconnect between ideals of justice and our flawed 
legal system, comparing the adversarial judicial process to the behavior of dumb beasts: 
 
Both truth and justice are essential to a system of law based on reason.  
We desperately need a generation of lawyers—and law teachers—who 
understand that access to justice does not invariably mean access to 
courtrooms.  Primitive people who relied on clubs and stones and brute 
strength to settle differences can be forgiven because they were unable to 
grasp the idea of any other method of dispute resolution.  But modern 
lawyers, educated in great universities and trained in the law, have no 
excuse for treating the judicial process as the primary mode of resolving 
conflicts.
129
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And so we have the framework for one of the great debates in law: the struggle 
between alternative/private/new dispute resolution and traditional/public/old legal 
system.   Many of the judges who wrote articles in the collection engage this debate on 
various points and at various levels.  Some wrestle with the data, considering whether and 
how alternatives processes improve efficiency in American courts.  Others wrestle with 
the philosophy, attempting to articulate and better understand the value-based tensions 
arising from introduction of mediation and other alternative practices into the civil justice 
system.  Being judges, the authors of these pieces are ready to take a position on the 
debate; being judges, they often take this position after setting up the strongest case they 
can for the opposing side. 
 The Debate Club theme attempts to capture the strands of argument, opinion, 
examination, intense conversation, and disagreement in the collection.  Listing out the 
apparent positions of each judge on various issues will not do justice to the vigor and 
intellectual energy in these articles.  Accordingly, this Part envisions some of these 
judges as actual participants in a debate club, formed into teams that argue the pros and 
cons of contentious, complex issues.   First, however, we must determine the question 
that the teams will debate. 
1. The Question for Debate   
Fortunately, Judge Larry Boyle from the District Court of Idaho provides the 
perfect debate question in his 2012 article, Mediate, Arbitrate or Litigate: What Would 
Lincoln Do?:  
 
“What would Lincoln do – mediate, arbitrate or take it to a jury?”130 
 
For many if not most Americans, Abraham Lincoln represents the very best of 
what lawyers can be.
131
  As Judge Boyle points out, “the overwhelming consensus [of 
Lincoln biographers] is that Lincoln was a premier attorney, and one of the most creative, 
intelligent and exceptional advocates ever to address a court or jury”132 and furthermore 
that Lincoln’s “ability to ride into town, make friends, win a client, analyze facts, cross-
examine and win a jury over were the skills that saved the Union!”133  Judge Boyle is 
quick to point out that Lincoln was a man, not a myth, but that even so demonstrated an 
extraordinary breadth of legal talents and leadership qualities.
134
  For the purpose of 
debate, however, Lincoln as legal legend will serve nicely.  Such a person, after all, 
would certainly know whether and how alternative processes should displace traditional 
ones.   
The question for debate, then, requires the teams to think through quintessential 
American values and norms around justice, freedom of choice, equal treatment, peace, 
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neighborliness, and no-frills common sense.  Note that in answering “what would Lincoln 
do” the positions below are stated as pro-mediation and pro-litigation.  Sorting the 
articles into these two positions is not meant to flatten the arguments into absolutist 
caricature on either side.  To be sure, the articles largely recognize the benefits of both 
approaches, though they do end up valorizing one more than the other.  
With these disclaimers in mind, let us hear first from the proponents of court-
connected mediation as selected from the collection: Judge Lisa Fenning, Senior Judge D. 
Duff McKee, Judge Robert P. Murrian, Judge Lisa Sullivan, and Judge Karen Klein. 
2. Lincoln Would Mediate  
 The pro-mediation position (which, to reiterate, is not an anti-litigation position) 
in the collection emphasizes three interrelated points.  One, the traditional legal system is 
broken and requires an overhaul.  Two, mediation adds value, both efficiency- and 
justice-wise, to court processes and dispute resolution.  And three, the practices and 
philosophical underpinnings of mediation disrupt the conventional patriarchal discourse 
of the traditional legal system, a discourse that enshrines and perpetuates historical 
inequities of power.  In so doing, mediation can provide space for different voices, 
experiences, and priorities.   
 First, and in agreement with Justice Burger, the pro-mediation side argues that the 
legal system does not work well enough for the complex needs of modern society.  Judge 
Fenning provides an example from the context of bankruptcy practice circa 1996: 
 
Chapter 11 [as a litigation process] isn’t working right.  Even its fans 
acknowledge the increasingly obvious symptoms of dysfunction.  The 
criticisms are not just coming from ivory-tower academics or special 
interest groups.  Leading judges and practitioners are saying it, too.
135
 
 
Judge Fenning argues that Chapter 11 proceedings are a poor fit in traditional 
binary litigation and are more correctly thought of as “mediation, not litigation.”136 
Additionally, she observes, “[c]hanneling access to the judge through adversarial 
pleadings encourages litigiousness as the only way to be heard.”137  In other words, the 
single-track approach of reducing everything to a civil case not only is a poor fit for 
certain matters, such as Chapter 11, but also limits lawyers and judges to a single tool—
adversarial practice—no matter what the nature of the problem or situation might be.  
Adding mediation to the quiver of problem-solving tools, according to Judge Fenning, is 
eminently sensible both as a matter of law and policy.  
Senior Judge McKee agrees with Judge Fenning’s assertion that adversarial 
practice is often insufficient or destructive.  He identifies lawyers as a big part of the 
problem.  “Given this growing legal climate [of settlement], and given the apparent 
simplicity of the money-damage-only case, … [w]hy not just turn the lawyers loose with 
instructions to negotiate and get out of the way?” he asks, and then answers his own 
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question: “[It is because] trial lawyers generally make lousy negotiators.”  Lawyers are 
“advocates” not “collaborators” and as such cannot be expected to handle the 
collaborative work of settlement.  Therefore: 
 
Enter the mediator.  A mediator brings to the settlement venue a bag full 
of devices to facilitate a settlement.  The devices are effective even when 
both sides appear to be fully prepared and motivated to settle. 
 
On this view, mediators help fix legal culture by providing the collaborative piece 
missing in the lawyerly personality and in the civil system more generally.  Judge 
Murriam supports this point, noting that “[t]rial by jury is just one option—and many 
times it will not be the best one.”  He argues that judges and trial lawyers should learn 
about the different ADR processes so that they can advise parties and clients accordingly.   
 The above argument that litigation alone cannot successfully serve the needs of 
modern disputants leads into the pro-mediation team’s second point, namely that 
mediation is added value in the court system.  For example, Judge Sullivan identifies five 
benefits of ADR in family law cases: quicker resolution, party self-determination, 
“venting opportunities,” “intangibles” such as dialogue between the parties, and positive 
modeling for future interactions between the parties.
138
  These value-adds are unavailable 
in the traditional legal framework because of docket congestion, and because of the 
highly structured process of litigation that precludes self-determination, discourages 
venting, forbids dialogue between the parties (when in session), and provides no space or 
guidance for forward-looking relational or communication modeling that may be useful 
to the parties.  Put another way, not only is mediation responsive to the inadequacies of 
the legal system by giving judges and lawyers different tools for managing cases, 
mediation also provides new educative and even therapeutic functionality in the courts.  
 Finally, the pro-mediation position closes with an article by Judge Klein on 
mediation and gender.
139
  Judge Klein applies Carol Gilligan’s formulation of “ethic of 
rights” (associated with men) and “ethic of care” (associated with women) to notions and 
practices around litigation and mediation today.
140
  On this view, litigation is loosely 
associated with men/“rights” orientation and (facilitative) mediation with women/“care” 
orientation.  Judge Klein then speculates that the growing number of women in the law 
may account for the “growing preference for resolving legal disputes through 
mediation.”141  As she puts it: 
 
Mediation has not grown in popularity solely because of the increasing 
presence of women and the awakening ethic of care in male lawyers; 
economic factors such as litigation cost and delay engendered by crowded 
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dockets have likely provided a significant impetus for the mediation 
explosion.  Yet, the contribution of care-based practice should not be 
discounted.  Growing acceptance of the different approach women bring 
to the profession and the subtle (or, maybe not so subtle) push of care-
minded lawyers has caused a shift from the win-lose dichotomy of 
litigation toward the client-driven, relational approach of mediation.
142
 
 
According to Judge Klein, court-connected mediation does more than just provide 
process diversity and added value.  Court-connected mediation makes room for more 
women (and men) lawyers, judges, and mediators; this in turn makes room for alternative 
values and priorities and voices, which then makes possible different and legitimate ideas 
about what constitutes a “fair” outcome to a dispute.  If we are satisfied that traditional 
conventional legal values and labels are sufficient, then surely we do not need these 
different voices; but, as Judge Klein points out, if we were indeed satisfied, then likely 
the different voices would not be raising their concerns and ideas about other ways our 
society might function. 
 And so the pro-mediation contingent returns to the earlier excerpted comments of 
Justice Burger and his call for disaggregating access to justice from courts and litigation.  
To recap, the pro-mediation team argued that mediation is an effective, valuable remedy 
to the procedural and value-based system failures of modern litigation.  And these 
comments are not coming from the ivory tower or wild-eyed community activists, but 
from judges who are intimately familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of the 
traditional system. 
With that, let us turn to the pro-litigation team selected from the collection: Judge 
James Gritzner, Judge Robert Martin, and—the heavy hitter—Judge Jack Weinstein. 
3. Lincoln Would Litigate   
The pro-litigation position (which, to reiterate, is not an anti-mediation position) 
in the collection focuses primarily on the core values of the civil justice system and 
assumes that the problems facing legal culture today (delay, congestion, bureaucracy) do 
not come from those core values but instead threaten them.  On this view, mediation and 
alternative practices are an attractive but dangerous fix for these problems (delay, 
congestion, bureaucracy) because if overused, alternative methods may themselves erode 
the core values beyond repair.  
 Chief among these core values is the conception of the judicial role as an 
“umpire,” impartial and passive, overseeing the contest between players with a stake in 
the outcome: 
 
We would all be astounded if, at a softball game, the umpire stepped out 
from behind the plate and instructed the outfielders to come in because the 
next batter was a weak hitter or shift toward right field for a left-handed 
batter.  Even more outrage would be expressed if our fictional umpire 
were to tell a shortstop to get back on the right side of second base 
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because the “Boudreau Shift” is not permitted on her diamond.  Yet, 
otherwise sensible bankruptcy lawyers and judges are suggesting that 
bankruptcy judges should abandon their role of deciding between 
positions advanced by advocates in favor of assuming the garb of a grand 
inquisitor to assess the bona fides of a debtor …143 
 
These words come from Judge Martin, who like Judge Fenning is writing about 
Chapter 11.  In this passage, Judge Martin invokes the popular image of judge-as-umpire 
and reminds the reader that the Anglo-American system does not brook inquisitors, as 
does the so-called Continental system of centralized inquisitorial practice.  Regarding the 
specific issues with Chapter 11, Judge Martin offers some suggestions for reform.
144
  He 
does not, however, extend these reforms to reinvention of the judge’s traditional role.  On 
the contrary, he frames his reform proposals as intended to fix the problems while 
“retain[ing] the judge’s traditional role as arbiter of controversies.”145 
 Judge Martin focuses on the importance of preserving the traditional judicial role.  
Judge Gritzner, for his part, turns the reader’s attention to the importance of preserving 
the civil trial itself.
146
  After describing the “all too infrequent[ ]”147 experience of 
watching the jury return to the jury box and deliver the verdict—the “purest form of 
democracy”148—Judge Gritzner describes what happens with mediation: 
 
Compare that [jury] experience with disputing parties gathered in a 
conference room or dueling conference rooms with the assistance of a 
mediator who postures, insists, and negotiates in an effort to get the most 
bang for the parties’ buck, to resolve the dispute in the least expensive 
way, to get the parties back to their normal business as quickly and 
cheaply as possible, and perhaps to obtain a result of strategic importance 
to their enterprise.  At that moment, we experience the purest form of 
capitalism.
149
   
 
Judge Gritzner states that the civil trial, though not extinct, is “on fairly equal 
footing with the American bison.”150  Factors tending to wipe out the civil trial include 
cost, delay, “user-unfriendly court rules and policies,” judicial hostility to trials, and the 
“increas[ing] importance of dispositive motions” that prevent cases from reaching the 
jury.
151
  Judge Gritzner’s fear is that ADR, as the primary corrective measure adopted by 
litigants and courts, will “grasp[ ] an ever-increasing share of our means to resolve our 
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disputes . . . The siren needs to sound or the ADR glacier will flatten the landscape.”152  
He concludes his article with an appeal to justice: 
 
Lastly, mediation lacks an important element.  Unless the parties walk 
away from mediation, the claimant always wins something and the 
defendant always gives up something—no one wins everything.  
Sometimes—indeed often—when one party wins everything, that is 
justice.
153
 
 
There is a distinctively American flair to Judge Gritzner’s prose (bison, glacier, winning) 
that underscores his substantive argument that, insofar as mediation and ADR replace the 
civil trial, they are undemocratic and un-American.   
 Now for Judge Weinstein.  “Before permitting traditional court functions to be 
supplanted by private dispute resolution approaches,” he states, “it is useful to reflect on 
the central role of the courts in society’s dispute resolution system of the past and the 
reasons for preserving that centrality in the future.”154   Like his teammates, Judge 
Weinstein is concerned about the public dimension of the law in the United States, not 
only as a matter of history but as an ongoing vibrant concern and essential resource of 
society: 
 
Procedures, jurisdictional rules, and other seemingly neutral devices that 
affect people’s ability to use the courts are part of a complex set of social 
relations.  Any device—whether ADR or changes in formal litigating 
procedure—that makes it more difficult to get into court, has a substantive 
effect on how people see their rights in the real world.  … Are we in 
danger of shutting the courthouse door to the have-nots with the excuse of 
procedural and substantive reform?  Any change which increases the 
difficulty of bringing suit will have a disproportionate effect on the poor 
and relatively powerless.
155
 
 
Judge Weinstein does not disapprove of mediation and ADR in all instances.   He 
believes that courts will serve people more effectively “both by improving court 
procedures, and by some privatization of dispute resolution.”156  Ultimately, however, the 
dominant mechanism for dispute resolution must be the public court system: 
 
We cannot forget, however, that in a democracy such as ours, the 
obligation for making law and for changing substantive balances among 
members of our society lies ultimately with members of our elected and 
appointed governmental legal institutions.  The power to control the law 
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and justice cannot be permitted to seep out of the hands of the people 
through privatization.
157
 
 
With that, the pro-litigation team concludes.  To recap, the pro-litigation side conceded 
that the civil justice system is indeed afflicted with problems such as cost and delay but 
disagreed that alternative processes should be the only or primary response to these 
problems.  On the contrary, too much ADR ventures on the undemocratic because 
alternative processes (such as mediation) have the potential of transforming judges into 
inquisitors; foreclosing trials and enervating the institution of the jury; valorizing 
business arrangements at the expense of rights; exposing weaker parties; making private 
what should be public; and eating away at the historical foundation of law and legal 
institutions in the United States. 
4. Who Wins, and Why Does It Matter?   
This imaginary debate is just that: imaginary.  The judges quoted above were not 
writing in response to the stated question or to one another.  They were not even writing 
in the same time periods.  But because Judge Boyle actually does answer the question 
“what would Lincoln do?” in his article, we can extend this thought experiment a little 
farther and declare a winner.   
Or can we?  In his article, Judge Boyle traces Lincoln’s professional evolution 
through law and then politics, a trajectory that found Lincoln both addressing juries in the 
courtroom and overseeing conciliations in his law offices.
158
  Based on this historical and 
biographical portrait of Lincoln, Judge Boyle concludes that this extraordinary person 
would not have conceived of dispute resolution process categories as abstract forms but 
instead would have fit his responses to the situation: 
 
[I]f he were practicing law with us today, at the beginning stages of a 
dispute I am confident Lincoln would be a peacemaker and negotiate with 
the other lawyer to reach real common ground.  I am confident he would 
practice law in much the same manner as fine lawyers practice today. . . . 
Regardless of whether Lincoln would choose to mediate, arbitrate or 
litigate, depending on the circumstances I believe he would do what was 
right, honest and best for his client.
159
   
 
Well, this answer is pretty unsatisfying.  We all know that Lincoln the legal 
legend would have done what was right, honest, and best.  What we do not know is 
whether he would have thought mediation, arbitration, or litigation most closely fit, as a 
general rule, what is right, honest, and best.  Answering “all three” refuses to prioritize 
these process choices, other than to give a slight preference to conciliatory processes at 
an early stage (a preference that is not antithetical to traditional litigation).   
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 On further reflection, however, Judge Boyle’s answer appears quite profound.  
First, by broadening the popular understanding of Lincoln’s professional capabilities and 
career to include not just trial work but also conciliation, the judge redefines what it 
means to be a great lawyer and statesperson.  In turn, he recasts the debate above as not 
being so much about process choices leading values but about values, community and 
judicial, defining process choices.  His answer therefore is both pro-mediation and pro-
litigation, forward-looking and traditional, all at once.   
 Additionally, by refusing to answer the question Judge Boyle sensibly leaves the 
debate open; thus, reflecting the current status of this debate today.  For those of us 
engaged in the project of developing broader public understanding of process choices 
within the framework of civic rights and responsibilities, identifying the rhetorical appeal 
of the different arguments in this debate is an important first step in developing a 
substantive message about how people can participate meaningfully in self-determination 
processes not only in litigation contexts but also in multiparty decision-making or 
deliberative democratic processes.  Reading through these Debate Club articles, at a 
minimum, resensitizes the reader to the kinds of arguments that resonate with people:  
Dignified treatment.  Efficient processes.  Competent, responsible state actors.  
Democratic participation.  Civic rights and duties, regarding self and other.  Protecting 
the disenfranchised.  Respecting where we have come from.  None of these arguments are 
proprietary to process choices, as Judge Boyle points out, but should instead inform both 
the rationale for making the choice and—importantly—the support provided (education, 
information, etc.) to those involved in and/or affected by the choice.  
V. CONCLUSION 
It would be a mistake to limit the possible interpretive projects of the dataset to 
efficiency tracking.  Although the articles provide a wealth of information about how 
judges prioritize (or say they prioritize) efficiency when thinking about mediation, this is 
not the only benefit of collecting these works. 
For example, within the how-to subset many potential interesting and unexplored 
comparison points exist.  A future study could do a closer reading of the how-to articles 
to determine whether and how mediator style (facilitative, evaluative, transformative) 
surfaces in these pieces.  To the extent mediator style is part of the judge’s analysis, it 
would be useful to examine how the judge characterizes the styles and what advice the 
judge gives for choosing between the styles.  To the extent that mediator style does not 
appear in the judge’s analysis, it would be helpful to suss out any assumptions made 
around what professional approaches mediators should take.  This kind of analysis would 
provide additional insight into the actual working definitions of mediation today.  
Additionally, further analysis could consider when and how judges cite to 
academics.  Although I did not make a disciplined study of this question, I did notice 
positive mentions of famous names like Carrie Menkel-Meadow, John Lande, and Marc 
Galanter now and then.  Although it is always a tricky business to try to figure out the 
relationship between judges and scholars, citations could provide another data point for 
mapping this relationship.  Such a project arguably sheds light on convergences between 
scholarly interests and judicial realities, which could provide more insight into how to 
direct research (or how to reform court systems). 
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It would also be helpful to see whether trends in judicial writing are consistent 
over subject areas, in terms of frequency over time.   
For me, this dataset supports a larger research agenda to identify normative and 
rhetorical devices that are, for lack of a better way to put it, appealing to normal people—
not to lawyers, not even necessarily to judges, but to people who are relatively untrained 
in dispute resolution processes.  Our democracy is confronting some of the largest, most 
complex public decision-making issues we have ever faced: among them, the 
environment; the prison system; the economy.  It is not enough to teach lawyers and 
neutrals to be effective in multiparty dispute resolution and decision-making contexts.  
Those who participate must also have a working knowledge of process, norms, and 
expectations.  Developing that knowledge will require, as one piece, an understanding of 
what makes sense to non-ADR experts about alternative processes.  Is ADR the new 
Civics? And if so, how can ADR scholars help develop the necessary curriculum and 
outreach to support this social and cultural transformation? 
Judges may be a better source of data on these matters than lawyers and scholars, 
because judges interact with the public on a much more regular basis than those other two 
groups do.  By collecting information about how mediation works and is perceived by 
judges, we have a more informed position from which to serve and educate the public.   
VI. APPENDIX – METHODOLOGY  
The goal for the starter dataset was to collect articles, in law reviews and other 
magazines and journals, written by judges on the topic of mediation.
160
  For the current 
phase of this project, my research assistant and I took a brute force search approach.  We 
scoured Westlaw for authors who appear to be judges (for example, searching for “Hon.” 
or “Honorable” or “Judge” in the author caption or star footnote) writing articles that 
appear to focus in some way on mediation.   
When we discover an article, we add an entry to a spreadsheet that contains the 
following information: Title; Author (single or co-author); Sitting/Retired; Citation; 
Journal; Year; Number of Pages; Area of Law; Person; and Judge/Mediator.   Most of 
these column titles are self-explanatory but a few may need additional definition.  “Area 
of Law,” for example, allows us to track whether the judge’s article is focusing on 
mediation in a particular legal context, such as bankruptcy or family law.  “Person” refers 
to whether the judge is writing in first, second, or third person.  “Judge/Mediator” 
attempts to capture whether the judge also serves as a mediator, either while sitting or 
after retired.  At present, the Judge/Mediator category does not specify whether the judge 
serves as a mediator on the same case.
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As with any search, there are limits to this approach.  First, with respect to the 
data gathering piece, the dataset will always be incomplete.  At present we are only 
looking at two legal databases.  Additionally, although we have tried to optimize our 
search strings, they are not guaranteed to reveal every judge-written article on mediation.  
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 The collection excludes books, perhaps arbitrarily so. 
 
161
 It will be important to figure this out at some point, as this is an area of debate.  See supra notes 24, 
49, 93 and accompanying text. In the near term we will supplement the writings with additional research 
that will make this much more accurate. 
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And even if we could reliably find every judge-written article on mediation in the 
database, our results still depend on choices made by the editors of Westlaw.  Their 
decisions, which undoubtedly change over time for reasons that may be impossible to 
find out, lead to the inclusion of certain publications in their online collection that in turn 
shapes what my dataset looks like.  So there is a certain arbitrariness to the original pull 
that may be impossible to cure.  
Moreover, depending on the article, not all of the columns on the spreadsheet are 
easy to fill in.  Figuring out whether a judge also acts as a mediator, for example, requires 
that the judge mention this fact in her article or biographical footnote.  For articles 
without such indicators, we just left the relevant field blank, which creates reporting 
errors if indeed the judge is also a mediator. 
Now that we have established the initial collection, the plan is to continue adding 
to the collection through ongoing searches of these (and possibly other) legal databases 
along with individual updates that may be forwarded.
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  Additionally, it would be useful 
to have more detailed coding on each article so that users can search the dataset more 
easily. 
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 We will be putting the list of articles on the internet this summer. 
